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Valuing Government Obligations When Markets are Incomplete
Jasmina Hasanhodzic and Laurence J. Kotlikoff




Determining how to value net government obligations is a long-standing and fundamental 
question in public finance. Its answer is critical to cost-benefit analysis, the assessment of fiscal 
sustainability, generational accounting, and other economic issues. This paper posits and 
simulates a ten-period overlapping generations model with aggregate shocks to price safe and 
risky government net obligations, including options. Agents can't trade with future generations to 
hedge the model's productivity and depreciation shocks. Nor can they invest in anything other 
than one-period bonds and risky capital. Our results are surprising. We find that the pricing of 
short- as well as long-dated riskless obligations is anchored to the prevailing one-period risk-free 
return. More surprising, the prices of obligations whose values are proportional to the prevailing 
wage (e.g., Social Security benefits under a pay-go system with a fixed tax rate) are essentially 
identical to those of safe obligations, i.e., there is little risk adjustment. This is true 
notwithstanding our assumption of very large macro shocks. In contrast, government obligations 
provided in the form of options entail significant risk adjustment. We also show that the value of 
obligations to unborn generations depends on the nature of the compensating variation. Another 
finding is that the one-period bond market matters, but less than expected, to valuing obligations. 
Finally, our model lets us test the ability of arbitrage pricing to get prices right. Surprisingly, with 
the right specification, it comes close. Although highly stylized, our model suggests the potential 
of detailed, largescale CGE OLG models to price government obligations as well as non-
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Properly valuing government commitments to pay benefits to or extract taxes from house-
holds is a longstanding issue in public finance. It figures prominently in cost-benefit analy-
sis, in valuing liabilities of government pension systems, and in assessing government inter-
and intra-generational redistribution. Were markets complete, one could simply check the
prevailing price of a given benefit or tax in a given contingent state. But markets are
far from complete for many reasons including the inability of the living to trade with the
unborn. Economists have attempted to overcome the missing-market problem by apply-
ing arbitrage pricing theory (APT) and treating government obligations as derivatives on
marketed assets—assets that arguably span the government’s promised payments, be they
positive, negative, safe or risky. Unfortunately, the assets/factors needed to span government
obligations may not exist. Alternatively, the specification of the spanning relationship may
materially alter the arbitrage pricing.1
An alternative approach is structural general-equilibrium modeling, which uses consumption-
asset pricing to value non-marketed government securities. Such pricing is based on marginal
compensating differentials—the extra current consumption needed to compensate agents for
forgoing future safe or risky net government payments. This approach, based on remaining
expected lifetime utility, fully captures the non-linear general equilibrium (GE) response of
the economy to shocks. In so doing, it eliminates the guesswork in specifying the nature
of government payment risk, albeit at the price of potentially mis-specifying the structural
model.
To date such GE analyses have primarily been based on infinitely-lived, single-agent mod-
els. Notwithstanding their widespread use, this framework appears unrealistic.2 The chief
concern is the assumption of intergenerational altruism. Such altruism effectively completes
intergenerational markets since current agents automatically internalize risks facing their
descendants. This can alter the intergenerational distribution of government-payment risk
since, as Barro (1974) showed, infinitely-lived agents fully offset government intergenerational
redistribution via private transfers. It can also change the economy’s general equilibrium
response to government policies – response that can amplify or reduce private-sector risk.
Since OLG models don’t include intergenerational altruism, they will, presumably, produce
1For example, Lucas and Zeldes (2006) and Geanakoplos and Zeldes (2010, 2011) postulate a different and
arguably more realistic reduced-form structure connecting lagged returns on a Social Security wage-growth
security, which pays off based on the realized growth rate of the wage, and stock returns than do Blocker,
Kotlikoff and Ross (2008). These differences in specifications produce significant differences in the valuation
of Social Security’s net liabilities.
2Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotlikoff (1992, 1997) and Hayashi, Altonji and Kotlikoff (1996) provide strong
evidence against operative intergenerational altruism underpinning this framework.
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different economic responses to macro shocks and, thus, different valuations of government
obligations depending on the policy in question.
Fortunately, recent computational advances permit simulating life-cycle models with
many periods, significant macro shocks, and alternative government policies. This paper
illustrates this approach, albeit in a highly stylized setting. It posits and simulates a ten-
period overlapping generations model to price government promises made to both current
and future generations. Prior to their births, future generations are assumed to have ex-
pected utility arising from consumption after they are born. Specifically, we assume an agent
age minus τ discounts utility from consumption (when alive) by an extra τ years—the time
it takes for her to be born.
Our model is a 10-period variant of Hasanhodzic and Kotlikoff’s (2013, 2017) 80-period
life-cycle model with aggregate risk and a one-period safe bond. Production is Cobb-Douglas
in capital and exogenously supplied labor. There are shocks to both total factor productivity
and capital’s rate of depreciation. Preferences over the single commodity are time separable
and isoelastic. There is also a one-period bond market. The Hasanhodzic-Kotlikoff solution
algorithm builds on Marcet’s (1988) method, which was further operationalized by Marcet
and Marshall (1994) and Judd, Maliar, and Maliar (2009, 2011). The method overcomes the
curse of dimensionality by solving for decision functions only in states that fall within the
economy’s ergodic set; i.e., in states that the economy will frequent, not those that it will
essentially never visit.3
We find that the pricing of both long- and short-dated riskless government payment
promises are closely anchored to the prevailing one-period risk-free return. Depending on
their payoff durations, these assets can be priced by discounting the future net payment at
rates either at or fairly close to the prevailing risk-free rate. Since the current return on
risk-free bonds can differ dramatically from the average risk-free return, our findings suggest
the importance of pricing government promises based on prevailing, not average historic
market returns.4 More surprising, short- and long-dated risky government payments, whose
amounts are proportional to the prevailing risky wage, are priced quite similarly to safe
pension promises, i.e., there is little risk adjustment. This is true notwithstanding our
model’s large macro shocks. On the other hand, we show that government obligations in the
3The Marcet method is not the only means of solving multi-period OLG models with macro shocks.
Krueger and Kluber (2004, 2006) apply Smolyak’s (1963) algorithm to efficiently choose grid values. Malin,
Krueger, and Kubler (2011) detail this method. Brumm and Scheidegger (2017) propose an adaptive sparse
grid approach to efficiently solve high-dimensional dynamic models, although their applications do not include
an OLG model.
4This point is particularly important for Social Security’s actuaries who, in the annual Social Security
Trustees Report, discount the system’s liabilities using an historic average real return.
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form of options are priced with a substantial risk premium. The message in these examples is
that risk-adjusted pricing is highly specific to the risk. We also find that pricing government
promises to the unborn, whether safe or risky, depends on the manner in which compensation
is provided. Another result involves the importance of the one-period bond market to valuing
obligations. The presence of the bond market matters, although less than one might expect.
Finally, we can use data generated by our model to explore the ability of arbitrage pricing to
get the prices right. We show that, with the right spanning assumptions, arbitrage pricing
theory (APT) can do remarkably well.
Our model is intentionally bare-bones to make qualitative, not precise quantitative points.
Its GE consumption-asset pricing is very different from the APT-based pricing frameworks of
Lucas and Zeldes (2006), Santos and Veronesi (2006), Goetzmann (2008), Blocker, Kotlikoff,
and Ross (2008), Khorasanee (2009), and Geanakoplos and Zeldes (2010, 2011). Although
we demonstrate that with the right reduced form, a GE structural or a reduced-form APT
approach can correctly price government I.O.U.s, we also show that specifying the wrong
APT reduced form can produce mis-pricing. Hence, the use of APT introduces an element
of risk not present in structural modeling. Of course, specifying the wrong structural model
also raises the risk of mis-pricing. Our goal here is not to adjudicate the two approaches. It’s
simply to suggest the potential for using large-scale CGE OLG models to price government
obligations and, indeed, private, non-marketed securities.
The next section reviews a small portion of the voluminous relevant literature. Subse-
quent sections present our model, describe its solution, discuss its calibration, examine the
precision and nature of our findings, and draw conclusions.5
2 Related Studies
There is a large literature concerning the proper means to value government net payment
promises, be they pension obligations, tax assessments, or returns from government invest-
ments. Lucas (2014) reviews key contributions and discusses the policy stakes involved. As
she points out, the sixties and early seventies witnessed a major debate over the proper
government discount rate. Hirschleifer (1964, 1966) argued for risk-adjusted discounting in
valuing government investments. Arrow and Lind (1970) argued for risk-free discounting
based on the government’s assumed superior ability to diversify idiosyncratic shocks and the
proposition that government investments are uncorrelated with macro risk.
Lucas (2014) sides with Hirschleifer, referencing the failure to detect idiosyncratic risk
5The model, except for the number of time periods, is identical to that in Hasanhodzic and Kotlikoff
(2017). Hence, we borrow freely from that paper in presenting the model and its solution method.
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in the pricing of securities. This as well as the myriad opportunities households have to
diversify investments implies that government promises to deliver future dollars should be
discounted at a higher rate the greater the risk of the payoff. Still, the “old” literature as
well as Lucas’ discussion makes clear that proper pricing of government promises, including
investment returns, depends on the financial-market-completing aspects of those promises
together with the other economic factors.
As Lucas (2012, 2014) stresses, getting the prices right matters. If, for example, govern-
ments borrow to invest in risky assets, but treat their future returns as risk-free, they will,
as Lucas puts it, falsely claim to have “a free money machine” and over invest. Disregarding
risk can also lead to the underfunding and over provision of government pensions as well as
an understatement of the true costs of government credit programs.
Clearly, having a fully specified CGE model permits precise consumption-based pricing
of government promises. Such modeling can, we believe, extend far beyond the highly
stylized framework presented here. This said, precisely how much detail RBC-in-OLG models
can accommodate remains to be seen. The alternative to structurally pricing government
promises is reduced-form, empirical pricing based on Ross’ (1976a, 1976b) Arbitrage Pricing
Theory (APT) and its associated risk-neutral, derivative-pricing and process-free pricing
theories.6
We say “reduced form” because the operationalization of this pricing method requires
positing and estimating how government promises co-vary with either marketed assets or a
subset of economic factors meant to capture undiversifiable economic risk. Lucas and Zeldes
(2006) is an early paper that applies modern asset-pricing theory and APT techniques to
value pension promises in a realistic setting. Their focus is on private-sector defined–benefit
pensions. But their approach extends automatically to government-provided pensions.
Blocker, Kotlikoff, and Ross (2008) also use risk-neutral derivative pricing to value pen-
sions. Their work differs from Lucas and Zeldes (2006) in two ways. First, they focus on
Social Security’s benefit and tax promises. Second, they relate the growth rate of wage rates
to current only or one-period-only lagged asset returns. They find very similar pricing of
wage growth rate securities regardless of the choice of contemporaneous or lagged regressors.
But their lagged regressors produce a much higher R-Squared.7
In contrast, Lucas and Zeldes (2006) posit a diffusion process for wages and stock val-
ues, which produces a small contemporaneous but significant long-term correlation between
earnings growth and stock returns. They justify their assumed process based on Goetz-
6See Cox and Ross (1976), Cox, Ingersol, and Ross (1977), Ross (1978), and Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein
(1979).
70.454 compared to 0.105
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mann’s (2005) finding of a low annual correlation between aggregate wage growth and stock
returns.8 Geanakoplos and Zeldes (2010, 2011) also value Social Security promises using a
diffusion process, pointing to Benzoni et al. (2007) as providing additional support for the
assumption of low short-run, but high long-run correlations between wage growth rates and
stock returns.9
The different approaches generate quite different assessments of Social Security’s un-
funded liabilities. Blocker et al. (2008) find a significant understatement of these liabilities.
Social Security’s mistake, they argue, is not its failure to adjust for risk, but its failure to
adjust for safety. Social Security’s actuaries discount benefits, once they’ve been received
and become sure liabilities, at a rate far above the market rate on long-term TIPS (Treasury
Inflation Protected Securities). Although Geanakoplos and Zeldes (2010, 2011) report that
Social Security’s liabilities are significantly overstated, they adopt Social Security’s overly
high safe discount rate. Hence, their measure of Social Security’s liabilities, while it may be
closer to the mark than Blocker et al. (2008), appears biased upward.
Geanakoplos and Zeldes (2010, 2011) object to Blocker et. al. (2008)’s use of a short
(one-year) lag structure in their wage-growth pricing formulation. Geanakoplos and Zeldes
cite Benzoni, Collin-Dufresne, and Goldstein’s (2007) empirical analysis in stating that “in
the long run, per capita wages, per capita consumption, and the value of the stock market
are likely to be tightly correlated, in which case financial markets would add a risk-premium
to the discount rate or set of discount rates.” We agree that such correlations could represent
evidence that the riskiness of wage growth-rate securities is closely tied to asset returns in
the past. But standard neoclassical models, which, unlike Geanakoplos and Zeldes (2011),
feature capital accumulation and decumulation, will exhibit such correlations even absent
uncertainty. Indeed, as shown below, lagged returns help predict current wage growth in our
model. But the source of this correlation is the model’s ergodic process and the fact that
the size of the capital stock (our model’s stock market) is a principal determinant of the
wage. Consequently, reduced-form estimation may be picking up the economy’s underlying
transition path in which temporarily low levels of capital produce high current rates of return,
which, other things equal, will be followed by higher stocks of capital and real wages. Our
point, in short, is that correlation can reflect more than risk.
8Blocker et al. (2008)’s results based on contemporaneous regressors support Goetzmann’s finding. But
their one-year lagged results suggest that current wage growth is well explained by relatively recent asset
returns.
9Geanakoplos and Zeldes (2011) provide an interesting Lucas tree-type model involving the early revela-
tion of news about future productivity shocks. This information acquisition produces zero short-run but high
long-run correlation between wage growth and stock returns. Their model is, however, very different from
ours. Our model incorporates capital accumulation and decumulation. And its current return to capital as
well as its current wage growth is fully determined by current economic conditions.
5
A different concern with each of the above-referenced APT-based studies that empirically
connect wage-growth rates to returns on stocks (as well as other assets) is that stock returns
aren’t necessarily well defined. Measured stock returns depend on firms’ announcements of
their leverage ratios. But, as Modigliani and Miller (1958) showed, leverage ratios, under
these authors’ assumed conditions, have no impact on the real economy. This implies, as
pointed out by Hasanhodzic (2014) and Hasanhodzic and Kotlikoff (2017), that announced
corporate leverage rates are simply linguistic measures, not fundamental economic concepts.
Consequently we are free to describe a given company’s leverage to be entirely different in
size and sign from what the company reports. Doing so can produce entirely different time
series of individual stock returns as well as correlations of stock returns, both current and
lagged, with current wage-growth rates.10
All the above said, our model provides a special opportunity to test APT in a controlled
manner. As we show, with the right APT specification, APT pricing does an excellent job
in approximating consumption-asset pricing based on our structural model. We also show,
however, that mis-specifying the reduced form or forming APT valuations based on average,
rather than contemporaneous returns, can be problematic.
3 The Model
Our model features G = 10 overlapping generations with total factor productivity and capital
depreciation shocks. Each agent works full time through retirement age R = 7, dies at age
G, and maximizes expected lifetime utility. Cohort members are identical. Each cohort
supplies 1 unit of labor each period when working. Hence, total labor supply equals the











10The Sharpe ratio will be invariant to the corporate labeling (descriptions) of its degree of leverage, but
only if the corporation reports the identical debt-equity ratio through time.
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where z is total factor productivity, ψ is capital’s share of output, Kt is capital, and Lt is
labor demand, which equals labor supply, R. Equilibrium factor prices satisfy












where depreciation δt ∼ N (µδ, σ2δ ) as in Ambler and Paquet (1994). Total factor productivity,
z, obeys
ln(zt+1) = ρ ln(zt) + εt+1, (5)
where εt+1 ∼ N (0, σ2).
3.1 Financial Markets
Households save and invest in either risky capital or one-period safe bonds. Investing 1 unit
of consumption in bonds at time t yields 1 + r̄t units in period t+ 1. The safe rate of return,
r̄t, is indexed by t since it is known at time t although it is received at time t+ 1. Bonds are
in zero net supply. Hence, households that are short (long) bonds, are borrowing (lending)
to one another. The total demand for assets of household age g at time t is denoted by θg,t
and its share of assets invested in bonds is denoted by αg,t. Households enter period t with
θg−1,t−1 in assets, which corresponds to the total assets they demanded the prior period.
Since investment decisions are made at the end of the period, the aggregate supply of capital






Bonds are in zero net supply11, hence for all t,
G∑
g=1
αg,tθg,t = 0. (7)
3.2 Social Security
Our model includes a pay-as-you-go Social Security system.12 Each retiree receives a benefit
each period equal to 0.35 times that period’s wage. This equals 0.15 times 7 divided by 3
reflecting our assumed 15 percent payroll tax rate and our model’s 7 workers per 3 retirees.
Hence, letting Hg,t denote the tax levied on the age-g household at time t and Bg,t denote
the benefit paid to the age-g household at time t, we have
Bg,t =
0.35× wt for g ∈ {8, 9, 10}0 otherwise, (8)
and
Hg,t =
0.15× wt for g ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 7}0 otherwise. (9)
11As shown in Green and Kotlikoff (2008), fiscal policy can be labeled in an infinite number of ways to
produce whatever time path of explicit and implicit debts the government wishes to report. Such relabeling
makes no difference to this or any other neoclassical model, i.e., all relabeled models are isomorphisms.
Hence, our model can be viewed as including government debt or not depending on the reader’s preferences.
With government debt included in the policy’s labeling, the left-hand-side of (7) would be larger by the
amount of debt. But the right-hand-side would also be larger by exactly the same amount, leaving the
capital stock unchanged.
12Although risk-free and risky returns are lower without Social Security, including Social Security makes
no difference to our findings.
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3.3 Household Problem
At time t the economy’s state is (st, zt), where st = (x1,t, . . . , xG−1,t) denotes the set of
age-specific holdings of cash on hand.13






for g < G, and (10)
VG(st, zt) = u(cG,t), (11)
subject to
c1,t = `1wt − θ1,t −H1,t +B1,t, (12)
cg,t = `gwt +
[
αg−1,t−1(1 + r̄t−1) + (1− αg−1,t−1)(1 + rt)
]
θg−1,t−1 − θg,t −Hg,t +Bg,t, (13)
for 1 < g < G, and
cG,t = `Gwt +
[
αG−1,t−1(1 + r̄t−1) + (1− αG−1,t−1)(1 + rt)
]
θG−1,t−1 −HG,t +BG,t, (14)
where cg,t is the consumption of a g-year old at time t, and (12)–(14) are budget constraints
for age group 1, those between 1 and G, and for age group G. With the above definitions of
cg,t, cash on hand is simply defined as xg,t = cg,t + θg,t.
3.4 Equilibrium
Given the initial state of the economy, (x1,0, . . . , xG−1,0, z0), the recursive competitive equi-
librium is defined as follows.
Definition. The recursive competitive equilibrium is governed by the consumption func-
tions, cg(s, z), the share of savings invested in bonds, αg(s, z), factor demands of the rep-
resentative firm, K(s, z) and L(s, z), Social Security policy as well as the pricing functions
r(s, z), w(s, z), and r̄(s, z) such that:
13Note that xG,t, the cash on hand of the oldest generation is not included in the state vector. When
the depreciation shock, δ, is zero, the value of xG,t can be inferred from the other state variables. When δ
is random, this is no longer the case. Now the initial value of xG,t (or equivalently the initial value of δ)
is needed to fully characterize the economy’s initial-period consumption vector. But we still exclude xG,t
from the state vector because it provides no addition information about the economy’s future evolution.
Also, we can directly calculate xG,t and, thus, the consumption of the old for periods beyond the first.
The depreciation shock, δ, could be included in the list or state variables, but it is left out for notational
convenience since it is integrated out in forming the expectation of future remaining lifetime utility.
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1. Given the pricing functions, the value functions (10) and (11) solve the recursive prob-
lem of the households subject to the budget constraints (12)–(14), and θg, αg, and cg
are the associated policy functions for all g and all dates and states.
2. Wages and rates of return on capital satisfy (3) and (4).
3. The government budget constraint (8) is satisfied.
4. All markets clear.














r̄(st, zt)− r(st+1, zt+1)
)]
, (16)
where Et is the expectation operator.
4 Calibration
The parameters, apart from our assume 15 percent payroll tax, τ , are calibrated as follows.
4.1 Endowments and Preferences
As indicated, agents work for R = 7 periods and live for G = 10. This corresponds to real
life ages 20 to 80, so each period in our model represents 6 years. We set the quarterly
subjective discount factor, β, to 0.99. This implies a six-year value of 0.786 for β. Risk
aversion γ equals 3.
4.2 Technology
We calibrate the TFP process, z, based on Hansen (1985) and Prescott (1986).14 Hansen
estimates a quarterly value for the autocorrelation coefficient, ρ, of 0.95 and a standard
14This TFP formuation is standard. See, e.g., Cooley and Prescott (1995), Ŕıos-Rull and Santaeulalia-
Llopis (2010), Gomme, Rogerson, Rupert, and Wright (2005), and Judd, Maliar, and Maliar (2011).
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deviation, σ, of the innovation ε ranging from 0.007 to 0.01. Prescott’s (1986) estimates are
0.9 for ρ and 0.00763 for σ.
Our assumed quarterly values for ρ and σ are 0.95 and 0.01, respectively. On a six-year
basis they are 0.292 and 0.031, respectively, generating a mean TFP value of 1.000 with a
standard deviation of 0.032. We set the quarterly value of the standard deviation, ψ, of the
depreciation shock, δ, to 0.0144 (implying a six-year value of 0.346).15 This is higher than
the 0.0052 quarterly estimate of Ambler and Paquet (1994).
With this calibration of the shocks, the annualized rate of return on capital displays a
standard deviation of 4.211 percent, around a mean of 7.023 percent. This accords fairly well
with the return on aggregate U.S. wealth in the data, which is characterize by an annual
standard deviation of 4.886 percent and a mean of 6.512 percent.16 Moreover, with this
calibration the wage displays a standard deviation of 0.050 around a mean of 0.500, for a
coefficient of variation of 10 percent.
5 Solution Method and Its Precision
Our algorithm contains outer and inner loops. The outer loop solves for consumption func-
tions of each generation. The inner loop uses a combination of techniques from the numerical
analysis literature—Broyden, Gauss-Seidel, and Newton’s method—to compute the agents’
bond holdings and the risk-free rate that clears the bond market.
Recall that the state vector consists of cash-on-hand variables, xg,t, of generations 1
through G − 1 and exogenous shocks. Given the information at time t, agents decide how
much of their cash on hand to consume, cg,t. They also choose the proportion αg,t of their
savings to allocate to bonds at the prevailing risk-free rate r̄t. The outer loop starts by
making an initial guess of stationary generation-specific consumption functions, cg, as linear
polynomials in the state vector and the prevailing depreciation shock.17 Next, we take a draw
15We interpret Y (equation 2) as the net production function, and hence set the mean value of depreciation
to zero.
16To measure the empirical equivalent to the model’s return on capital we use the national income ac-
counting identity that Wt+1 = Wt + rtWt + Et − Ct − Gt, where Wt stands for national wealth at time t ,
Et stands for labor income at time t, Ct standards for household consumption at time t, and Gt stands for
government consumption at time t. We solve this identity for annual values of rt by plugging in values of
Wt, reported in the Federal Reserve’s Financial Accounts data, and Et, Ct, and Gt, reported by the Bureau
of Economic Analysis in the National Income Accounts. Our data for this calculation cover 1947-2015. All
data were converted into real dollars using the PCE index and measured at producer prices. The share of
labor earnings in proprietorship and partnership income was assumed to equal the overall share of labor
income to national income on a year-by-year basis.
17Although we do not include δ as part of the theoretical state space, using it as a regressor for approxi-
mating the consumption functions proved useful.
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of the path of shocks for T = 600 periods. We then run the model forward for T periods
using the economy’s initial conditions (which corresponds to the non-stochastic steady state
of the no-policy model), guessed consumption functions and the drawn shocks. I.e., we
compute cash-on-hand variables at time t + 1 using the information we have at time t and
the exogenous shocks at time t+ 1.18
At each time t, we compute the agents’ choice of bond shares and the risk-free rate that
clears the bond market. To solve for r̄t, we use Broyden’s method based on the bond-market
clearing condition (equation 7). This condition requires that the sum of bond holdings at
time t equals zero. The bond holdings at time t of each agent age g is αg,tθg,t. The choice of
the αg,t’s make them functions of r̄t. Hence, for given values of the θg,t’s, the bond-market
clearing condition is a function of r̄t and can be used, via Broyden’s method, to find the r̄t
that sustains market clearing.
For any given r̄t, the choice of αg,t’s is determined by Gauss-Seidel iterations to solve the
system of simultaneous G − 1 generation-specific Euler equations governing the choices of
the G− 1 α’s for the new values of those α’s. Specifically, for given guesses of each agent’s
value of α, other than that of agent i, we apply Newton’s method to agent i’s Euler equation
to determine the new guessed value of α for agent i.19
Simulating the model forward produces the data needed to update our guessed consump-
tion functions. Specifically, for each age group g and each period t, we evaluate the Euler
condition to determine what that age group’s consumption should be in that period. This
calculation is based on the derived period-t state variables and the current guessed con-
sumption functions of all age groups. These functions determine each age-g agent’s marginal
utility of consumption at t+ 1.
Following Judd, Maliar, and Maliar (2009, 2011), we then regress these time series of
age-specific consumption levels on the state variables plus the depreciation shock using least
squares with Tikhonov regularization. We use the new regression estimates to update, with
dampening, the polynomial coefficients of each guessed consumption function. We iterate
the updating of these functions based, always, on the same draw of the path of shocks until
all consumption functions converge. We evaluate the accuracy of our solutions using two
methods proposed in the literature—out-of-sample deviations from the exact satisfaction of
the Euler equations and the statistic proposed by Den Haan and Marcet (1989, 1994). We
also consider whether each age group accurately prices safe assets dated one period in the
future.
18The α’s and the r̄, which are determined at time t, are used to compute each age cohort’s cash-on-hand
in period t+ 1.
19Taking other unknowns as given is Gauss-Seidel.
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5.1 Out-of-Sample Deviations from the Perfect Satisfaction of Eu-
ler Equations
A satisfactory solution requires that generation-specific Euler equations (15) hold out of
sample. Hence, to test the accuracy of our solution, we draw a fresh sequence of 2000
sets of shocks for each simulated model. We then run the model forward for 2000 years,
imposing the drawn shocks, using the original consumption functions, cg, and clearing the
bond market by rerunning the model’s inner loop each year as we move through time. To
calculate out-of-sample, unit-free deviations from full satisfaction of the Euler equations, we
form
ε(sg,t, zg,t) = βEt
[(





for each period in the newly simulated time path and for each generation g ∈ {1, . . . , G−1}.
Finally, we compute the average, across time, of the absolute value of the deviations from
these Euler equations for each generation.
The top panel of Table 1 reports summary statistics, across generations, of their average
absolute deviations from Euler equations for our model with and without the bond market.20
As indicated, in all cases these deviations are at most 0.005.
The portfolio choice equations (16) and the bond market-clearing condition (7) hold very
precisely by construction, since the α’s and r̄ that satisfying them are calculated in the inner
loop with a high degree of precision. In particular, the average absolute deviations from
these equations, which theoretically should equal zero, are at most 3× 10−7 and 9.8× 10−5,
respectively, and in most cases are smaller by an order of magnitude.
5.2 The Den Haan-Marcet Statistic
An alternative precision test is provided by Den Haan and Marcet (1989, 1994). Taylor and
Uhlig (1990) use this test to compare alternative solution methods for nonlinear stochastic
growth models. We follow Taylor and Uhlig’s particular implementation method.
As above, we start with a fresh draw of shocks over T periods and simulate the model
forward based on these shocks, using the original consumption functions and clearing the
20Note, these deviations are not Euler errors, which capture differences in period t’s marginal utility and
period (t + 1)’s realized marginal utility (properly weighted by β and r(s′, z′)). Rather, they reference
mistakes in satisfying the Euler equation, i.e., the discrepancy in period t between the marginal utility and
its properly weighted time-t expectation.
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Min Mean Max
Bond Market 0.003 0.004 0.005
No Bond Market 0.002 0.003 0.005
Bond Market 4.521 9.613 12.410
No Bond Market 5.151 10.360 16.236
Mean Absolute Euler Equation Deviations
Den Haan-Marcet Statistic
Solution Precision
Table 1: The minimum, mean, and maximum values, calculated across generations, of the average, cal-
culated across time, of the absolute generation-specific, out-of-sample deviations from perfect satisfaction
of the Euler equations are reported in the top panel. The bottom panel reports the minimum, mean, and
maximum values across generations of the Den Haan-Marcet statistic. The model’s precision statistics are
computed in both the presence and the absence of the bond market.
bond market each period based on the inner loop technique (discussed above). We set T to
1200, twice the length of the original simulation. Then, for each generation-specific Euler







We next regress, separately for each generation, their 1200 ηg values on a matrix xg consisting
























If the generation-specific Euler equations (15) are satisfied, then Et−1[ηg(t)] = 0 must hold.
This implies that the coefficient vector, and, therefore, mg are zero, which is the null hy-
pothesis. Note that our solution method does not enforce this property, so as Den Haan and
Marcet (1994) point out, theirs is a challenging test.
Under the null, mg is distributed as χ
2(11) asymptotically. Based on a two-sided test
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at the 2.5 percent significance level, we would fail to reject the null if mg lies outside the
interval (3.82, 21.92). In the bottom panel of Table 1 we compute the minimum, mean, and
maximum across generations of generation-specific statistics mg for our model in both the
presence and the absence of the bond market. In all cases, the mean across generations of
the statistic is well within the acceptance interval.
5.3 Discount Rates for Pricing a One-Period Goverment Payment
Promise
Yet a third way to test for our model’s accuracy is to consider our derived rates for discounting
one-period-ahead safe government payments. Combining equations 15 and 16 yields equation
21:





This equation states that all generations at time t price a sure payment made a period from
the present at 1/(1 + r̄(st, zt)). In the asset-pricing tables presented below, the first column
presents the derived one-period ahead discount rates for generations of different ages. Since
our model’s solution doesn’t directly incorporate equation 21, differences in the values in
the first columns imply differences in 1/(1 + r̄(st, zt)) and represent a third measure of the
model’s goodness of fit. As will be apparent, there are differences in discount rates in the
first columns. For example, in our first pricing table, Table 3, the prevailing value for r̄(st, zt)
is 0.050 on an annualized basis. But one value in the column equals 0.048. This represents
a four percent difference in annualized discount rates, but only a 1.15 percent difference in
the price of the security.21
6 Valuing Government Promises
We first review consumption-asset pricing of government payments to the living and then
extend this method to pricing obligations to the unborn.
21This figure is calculated by dividing (1/1.048)6 by (1/1.05)6. Indeed, across all the tables presented
below, the largest discrepancy across generations in the pricing of a one-period safe security is 2.18 percent.
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6.1 Valuing Government Payment Promises to the Living
Equation 22 considers the impact on the remaining lifetime utility of an agent age g in year t
of paying mg,t units of corn to the government in period t and receiving ε̃t+τ × P̄t+τ from the
government in period t+τ , where the later term is the average value of the payment and the
former term, which has a mean of 1, is its random component. Equation 23 calculates how
much mg,t needs to increase to compensate for the receipt of the risky t+ τ payment. This
is marginal consumption-asset pricing. It tells us how much additional current consumption
is needed to compensate the agent (and, thereby, maintain her expected remaining lifetime
utility) for foregoing the future government payment.22 Note that if ε̃t+τ = 1 for all τ , the
government’s payment is a safe asset. Equation 24 relates the implied per period discount
rate, µ, to the price of the asset, and equation 25 annualizes it. This annualized discount
rate will be presented in the tables below.
EUg,t = u(cg,t −mg,t) + βEt[u(cg+1,t+1)] + . . . (22)
+ βτEt[u
(
cg+τ,t+τ + ε̃t+τ × P̄t+τ
)












(1 + µg,t+τ )τ
, (24)
µannualg,t+τ = (1 + µg,t+τ )
1/6 − 1. (25)
6.2 Valuing Government Payment Promises to the Unborn
Equations 26–29 present the analogue to equations 22–25 for those not yet born:
22Equivalently, mg,t is the reduction in current consumption needed to offset the provision of the risky










] + βg+1Et[u(c2,t+g+1)] + . . . (26)
+ βτEt[u
(
cτ−g+1,t+τ + ε̃t+τ × P̄t+τ
)










where vt equals r̄t−1 if the method of compensation is safe, and r̃t otherwise.
23 The implied





(1 + µ−g,t+τ )τ
, (28)
µannual−g,t+τ = (1 + µ−g,t+τ )
1/6 − 1. (29)
The difference in compensation is that m−g,t, although determined at time t, can’t be
paid out to the unborn agent until the agent is born. In the meantime, m−g,t can be invested
either at the sequence of ensuing “risk-free” returns or the ensuing risky returns on capital.
As equation 27 makes clear, how m−g,t is invested will affect its size. This point is important.
It means, for example, that the means by which future generations would be compensated
for shutting down an ongoing government pension system will alter the calculated costs of
doing so. The U.S. Social Security system’s valuation of its unfunded liability is a case in
point.24 Social Security’s actuaries calculate its unfunded liability annually on both 75-year
and infinite-horizon bases.25 The word “liability” references what is owed. To Social Security
actuaries what is owed is what is needed, on average, to keep the system paying benefits.
But to economists, what is owed is what is needed to fully compensate the creditor. This
23Recall r̄t−1 is determined at time t− 1 and realized at time t.
24Social Security references this as their closed group liability.
25See tables VIE1 and VIF1 in https://www.ssa.gov/OACT.
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depends on the riskiness of Social Security’s net benefit promises and, as just pointed out,
on the risk arising due to the method used by Social Security to redeem its obligations to
future generations.
7 Results
Turning to the results, we begin by comparing the volatility of the model’s aggregate variables
with the data. Next, we present the discount rates associated with pricing the safe and risky
promises to the living and the unborn. We then consider the impact of the bond market on
pricing. Finally, we use the data generated by our model to study how well specific Arbitrage
Pricing Theory reduced forms can approximate the pricing of government obligations.
7.1 Comparing the Model’s Volatility of Per Capital Output and
Per Capita Consumption with the Data
Model/ Data S.D. (%)
Model 9.947
Real Net National Product, 1929-2015 5.937
Model 15.474
Real Personal Consumption Expenditures, 1929-2015 2.904
Output
Aggregate Consumption
Standard Deviation of Percent Deviations of Output and 
Consumption from Trend
Table 2: Standard deviations of percent deviations from trend of U.S. per capita real net national product
and U.S. per capita real personal consumption expenditures, 1929–2015 as well as standard deviations
of percent deviations from the mean of output and aggregate consumption in the model. Data source:
https://fred.stlouisfed.org. Reported NNP is converted to constant dollars using the GDP deflator. For each
of the two annual data series, we first detrend using the Hodrick-Prescott filter, and then aggregate using
6-year rolling windows. The latter is done to allow for a fair comparison of the data with the model, in
which each period represents six years. Using 6-year non-overlapping windows to aggregate the data yields
similar results, namely a standard deviation of 6.977 percent for NNP and 2.800 percent for consumption
expenditures.
Table 2 compares the variability of per capita output and per capita consumption from our
model to their empirical counterparts. Following Prescott’s (1986) procedure, we detrend
these per capita series for the years 1929 through 2015 and form standard deviations of
percent deviations from trend. Our model abstracts from growth, so we simply form the
standard deviation of our model’s percentage deviation of annual output from its mean. As
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the table shows, our model overstates actual per capita output variability by a factor of
almost 2. It overstates the variability of per capita consumption by a factor of roughly 5.
Hence, our finding (presented below) of small risk adjustment cannot be attributed to an
understatement of output variability.
7.2 Pricing Safe Promises to the Living
Each table in this section shows the discount rates that would be applied by an agent at a
given age who is a given number of periods away from receiving a sure payment in valuing
that payment.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 0.050 0.053 0.056 0.058 0.060 0.061 0.063 0.064 0.065
2 0.049 0.052 0.055 0.057 0.060 0.061 0.063 0.064
3 0.051 0.053 0.056 0.058 0.061 0.062 0.064
4 0.048 0.052 0.055 0.057 0.060 0.062
5 0.049 0.052 0.055 0.058 0.060
6 0.050 0.053 0.056 0.058
7 0.050 0.053 0.056
8 0.051 0.054
9 0.049
Annual Discount Factors for a Safe Asset for the Living
Average 0.069 0.077
Model with Social Security
Low Risk-Free Rate, High Return on Capital Initial State










Risk-Free Rate Return on Capital
Current 0.050 0.108
Table 3: Annual discount factors for a safe payment promised to the living. Initial state features a low
risk-free rate and a high return on capital.
Tables 3 and 4 show the rates at which safe government payments are discounted, i.e.,
priced, in our model. These discount rates are defined in equations 22–25. Table 3 considers
initial conditions that feature a low risk-free return on bonds, namely 5.0 percent and a high
risky return on capital, namely 10.8 percent. Average returns on these securities, calculated
based on 600 observations, are, as indicated, 6.9 percent and 7.7 percent, respectively. Con-
sequently, the model is producing a risk premium, but one that’s relatively small.26 Table 4
26As Hasanhodzic (2015) shows, adding increasing marginal borrowing costs to our model can reproduce
the observed U.S. risk premium. Hasanhodzic and Kotlikoff (2017) replicate her results in an 80-period
model. We omitted such borrowing costs in this study to keep the model as simple as possible given that,
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 0.087 0.087 0.086 0.085 0.084 0.084 0.083 0.082 0.082
2 0.087 0.086 0.086 0.085 0.084 0.083 0.082 0.082
3 0.085 0.084 0.084 0.082 0.082 0.081 0.080
4 0.087 0.087 0.086 0.085 0.085 0.084
5 0.088 0.087 0.087 0.086 0.085
6 0.088 0.087 0.087 0.086
7 0.089 0.088 0.088
8 0.088 0.088
9 0.087
Annual Discount Factors for a Safe Asset for the Living
Current 0.087 0.041
Average 0.069 0.077
Model with Social Security
High Risk-Free Rate, Low Return on Capital Initial State










Risk-Free Rate Return on Capital
Table 4: Annual discount factors for a safe payment promised to the living. Initial state features a high
risk-free rate and a low return to capital.
flips the relative sizes of prevailing (initial) risk-free and risky returns. The table’s risk-free
rate is 8.7 percent and its risky return is 4.1 percent. A quick glance at Tables 3 and 4 shows
that the discount rates needed to price safe payments are highly dependent on the prevailing
one-period safe rate of return. Thus Table 3’s discount rates are seemingly anchored to its
5.0 percent risk-free rate, whereas Table 4’s discount rates strongly reflect its 8.7 percent
discount rate.
As discussed above, were our solution method free of approximation error, the values in
the first column would each equal the prevailing risk-free rate. This isn’t the case, but, again,
the discrepancies, where they arise, are small and translate into even smaller percentage
differences in the price of a one-period-ahead safe asset.
The two tables’ results are interesting in three respects. First, none of the discount
rates, even many periods from the present, differ substantially from the initial-period risk-
free return. This is the sense in which we describe these discount rates as anchored by the
prevailing one-period safe return. Second, since the initial safe returns in the two tables are
5.0 percent and 8.7 percent, the discount rates across the two tables are very different. This
seems a both surprising and important finding. As we’ll see, this finding that prevailing
economic conditions are critical to pricing safe government obligations carries over to the
as we show, the risk premium is not the key to pricing government obligations. The key is the prevailing
risk-free rate, which varies considerably across states.
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pricing of risky obligations. This prescription to price based on current economic conditions
is at strong odds with actual U.S. government practice. Take the Social Security system’s
Annual Trustees Report. Its annual reported liabilities are routinely discounted at a roughly
3.0 percent real return regardless of the economy’s current position and real returns on TIPS
(Treasury Inflation Protected Securities).
Second, the pricing of safe payments a given number of periods into the future is ap-
proximately invariant to an agent’s age. Third, as one would expect, given that there is no
market for long-term safe assets and there is more uncertainty about the future the farther
out one goes, discount rates change with the distance in time until the payment is received.
More precisely, when the initial risk-free rate is below its mean, discount rates rise for pay-
ments farther out and vice versa when the initial risk-free rate is above its mean. In other
words, discount rates farther out are seemingly influenced by the mean risk-free rate. What’s
surprising is the small degree of that influence. In Table 3, for example, the discount rate
for a safe payment promised in six periods to a 3-period year-old is 6.2 percent, which is
higher by 1.2 percentage points than the initial 5.0 percent one-period safe rate. In Table 4,
the corresponding discount rate is 8.1 percent, which is 0.6 percentage points less than the
initial 8.7 percent one-period safe rate. Clearly, 6.2 percent is much closer to 5.0 than to 8.7.
Similarly, 8.1 percent is much closer to 8.7 percent than to 5.0 percent.
7.3 Pricing Risky Promises to the Living
Before turning to the pricing results associated with risky promises, let us examine how they
should differ from the corresponding results for the safe promises presented above. Equation
30 decomposes the pricing of a risky security into safe and risky components:






Cov(u′(ct+τ ), εt+τ )
u′(ct)
, (30)
where E[εt+τ ] = 1.
The safe component is the price of a sure promise, which we valued in prior tables. The
risky component reflects the covariance of consumption with the shock to the level of the
average payment promised. If this covariance is small, risky promises will be valued/priced
like safe promises.
Tables 5 and 6 present pricing of risky promises for the respective initial conditions of
Tables 3 and 4. Tables 5 and 6 are identical to Tables 3 and 4 except that the former
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 0.050 0.055 0.058 0.060 0.062 0.063 0.064 0.066 0.066
2 0.049 0.054 0.057 0.059 0.061 0.063 0.064 0.066
3 0.051 0.056 0.059 0.061 0.062 0.064 0.065
4 0.049 0.054 0.057 0.059 0.061 0.063
5 0.049 0.054 0.057 0.060 0.062
6 0.050 0.055 0.058 0.060
7 0.050 0.055 0.058
8 0.052 0.056
9 0.049
Annual Discount Factors for a Risky Asset for the Living
Model with Social Security
Low Risk-Free Rate, High Return on Capital Initial State
Average 0.069 0.077










Risk-Free Rate Return on Capital
Current 0.050 0.108
Table 5: Annual discount factors for a risky payment to the living. Initial state features a low risk-free
rate and a high return to capital.
tables price promises to a sure unit of corn at different dates, whereas the latter tables price
promises to the same unit of corn, on average, but where the exact payment equals the same
average payment multiplied by εt—the ratio of the realized wage to its average value.
Note first that the discount rates (implicit security prices) in the pairs of tables corre-
sponding to the same initial condition, where one table in the pair incorporates no risk and
the other one incorporates risk—Tables 3 and 5, and Tables 4 and 6—are essentially identi-
cal. The difference in the two table entries for the same row and column represent the risk
premium. As is immediate from comparing the corresponding columns, the risk premium
is very close to zero. Consider, for example, the 8.2 percent rate at which an agent age 1
period discounts a safe promise 9 periods into the future in Table 4. If the promise is risky,
in the manner specified, the discount rate is 8.3 percent (see Table 6). Given equation 30,
the risk premium is calculated by subtracting each entry in Table 5 (6) from its counterpart
in Table 3 (4). Hence, the risk premium is only 0.1 percent. The risk premiums for other
combinations of current age and periods till benefit received are also essentially zero.
There are two potential explanations for this finding. One is that there is very little
unexpected variability in the government payment (i.e., in the wage, since the payment
is proportional to the wage). The second is that this variability is not correlated with
consumption.
Table 7 presents the coefficient of variation of the wage for each of the nine periods
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 0.088 0.088 0.087 0.086 0.086 0.085 0.084 0.083 0.083
2 0.087 0.088 0.087 0.086 0.085 0.084 0.083 0.083
3 0.085 0.086 0.085 0.084 0.083 0.082 0.082
4 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.087 0.086 0.085
5 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.087 0.086
6 0.088 0.089 0.088 0.087
7 0.089 0.089 0.089
8 0.088 0.089
9 0.087
Annual Discount Factors for a Risky Asset for the Living
Current 0.087 0.041
Average 0.069 0.077
Model with Social Security
High Risk-Free Rate, Low Return on Capital Initial State










Risk-Free Rate Return on Capital
Table 6: Annual discount factors for pricing a risky payment to the living. The initial state features a high
risk-free rate and a low return on capital.
subsequent to the occurrence of the initial conditions introduced in Tables 3 and 4. These
coefficients, starting from the initial conditions of Tables 3 and 5, rise from 3.1 percent one
year out to 10.8 percent 9 years out. The corresponding coefficients starting from the initial
conditions of Tables 4 and 6 are virtually indistinguishable, rising from 3.1 percent to 10.2
percent.
This is a rather small degree of variability. Furthermore, not all of this variability reflects
risk. Some share of this variability was, by the nature of our model and its ergodic progress,
expected well before the payment was made. This provided agents time to adjust their
saving and, thereby, limit the impact of the wage “shock” on future consumption. This said,
the relatively small wage variability goes a long way to explaining why wage-based risky
government promises are valued as essentially safe.
These coefficients of variation may suggest that our model has too little risk. But, accord-
ing to Table 2, the model is producing more output and aggregate consumption variability
than the actual economy. As for wages, the coefficient of variation of the detrended median
wage of full-time male workers reported by the St. Louis Federal Reserve is 0.027.27. The
corresponding coefficient of variation of wages in our model’s simulated time series is 0.100.
27The data can be found at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/LEU0252881900A. It reports the median
usual weekly real earnings for full-time employed men from 1979 to 2016. After detrending, we convert the
weekly values to six-year values by multiplying them by 288 so that the results are comparable to the period
length in the model
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Hence, the model’s wage variability is almost four times higher than the economy’s.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0.031 0.075 0.093 0.102 0.108 0.110 0.110 0.109 0.108
0.031 0.064 0.079 0.088 0.095 0.098 0.099 0.100 0.102
Coefficient of Variation of the Wage for the Living
Periods Till Payoff Received
High Risk-Free Rate, Low Return on Capital
Low Risk-Free Rate, High Return on Capital
Initial State
Table 7: The coefficient of variation of the wage for each of the nine periods subsequent to the occurrence
of the initial conditions characterized by the low (high) risk-free rate and high (low) return to capital.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 0.091 0.101 0.102 0.101 0.100 0.098 0.095 0.093 0.092
2 0.090 0.100 0.102 0.101 0.099 0.097 0.095 0.093
3 0.088 0.099 0.101 0.100 0.099 0.097 0.095
4 0.090 0.101 0.102 0.100 0.099 0.097
5 0.090 0.101 0.101 0.100 0.099
6 0.090 0.100 0.101 0.100




Annual Discount Factors for a Risky Asset with Higher Payoff Volatility for the Living
Model with Social Security
High Risk-Free Rate, Low Return on Capital Initial State










Risk-Free Rate Return on Capital
Current 0.087 0.041
Table 8: Annual discount factors for pricing a high-volatility risky payment promised to the living. Here
εt has the same mean but ten times the standard deviation of εt associated with the regular risky asset. The
initial state is characterized by a high risk-free rate and a low return on capital.
Table 8 further investigates the risk premium associated with wage-based government
payment promises. It repeats Table 6, but applies a mean-preserving spread to increase the
variance of εt+τ by a factor of 10.
28 Comparing the two tables shows that the long-term
discount rates rise by roughly 100 basis points. But, interestingly, the short-term discount
rates, although higher, remain close to the prevailing risk-free rate. Medium-term discount
rates rise by close to 150 basis points.
The message is that risk premiums associated with wage-linked government payments,
particularly long-term risk premiums, are responsive to the level of risk. Still, they seem
28To be specific, we use 10(εt+τ − E[εt+τ ]) + 1 where E[εt+τ ] = 1.
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smaller than one might expect.
Why are changes in wage rates so poorly correlated with changes in the marginal utility
of consumption? Part of the answer, discussed in Hasanhodzic and Kotlikoff (2013, 2017),
is that agents can use the one-period bond market to help insure each other against the
economy’s TFP and depreciation shocks. These risk-sharing arrangements will take into
account the autocorrelation in the TFP process as well as the natural ergodic process by
which the model, other things equal, returns to the mid point of its stochastic steady state.
Hence, they can provide insurance not only against immediate negative wage shocks, but
also the expected longer-term impact of such shocks.
Indeed, the ergodic nature of our stochastic OLG model means that current TFP and
depreciation shocks will have predictable impacts on future wages. Thus, some, if not most of
the “shock” to wages may come as no surprise to agents. Hence, for example, a 3-period year
old who experiences, along with other agents, large negative current TFP and depreciation
shocks can expect wages to be lower, on average, in future periods because it takes time for
the economy to adjust back to its standard position (ignoring ensuing shocks).
A second explanation is that workers experience multiple shocks over their lifetimes—
shocks that generally average out. This permits workers to effectively self insure. A third
explanation is that middle aged and older workers hold assets, the principal of which is
invariant to productivity if not depreciation shocks.
The left-hand-side panel of Table 9 presents a regression of wage growth at time t on a
constant and four lags of risky returns.29 The data used in this analysis come from simulating
the model over 600 periods starting from the initial condition corresponding to the model’s
average values of the state variables. Both current and lagged regressors (rates of return
lagged by one or four periods, where, again, each period represents six years) are significant
at least at a 5 percent level. Based on their model, Geanakoplos and Zeldes (2011) would view
the significance of the lagged regressors as reflecting early news about future productivity
shocks. But in our model, agents don’t learn about shocks until they occur. Instead, the
message of this regression—that the returns that arose in the past help predict wage growth
today—reflects the economy’s ergodic process. It also tells us that agents in our model can
infer much of what’s coming with respect to wage-based government payments far before
those payments are made.
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Intercept -0.127*** Intercept -0.108*** Intercept 0.096***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
r(t) 0.037** r(t-1) 0.177*** r(t) -0.022***
(0.053) (0.000) (0.009)

























p (F) 0.000 p (F) 0.000 p (F) 0.000
Obs. 596 Obs. 596 Obs. 596
Coefficients
Contemporanous plus 
four period lagged safe 
and risky returns




Regressions of Growth Rate of Wages on Contemporaneous and Lagged 
Safe Returns (rb) and Risky Returns (r)
Significance
Table 9: Regressions of the growth rate of wages on contemporaneous and lagged returns. Statistical
significance is denoted by stars at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels, respectively.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 0.227 0.163 0.142 0.130 0.122 0.115 0.110 0.106 0.103
2 0.226 0.163 0.142 0.129 0.121 0.115 0.109 0.106
3 0.223 0.161 0.141 0.128 0.120 0.114 0.109
4 0.225 0.163 0.142 0.129 0.121 0.115
5 0.225 0.163 0.141 0.129 0.121
6 0.224 0.162 0.141 0.129





Annual Discount Factors for a Government Option for the Living
Model with Social Security
High Risk-Free Rate, Low Return on Capital Initial State










Risk-Free Rate Return on Capital
Table 10: Annual discount factors for a government option provided to the living. The payoff of the option
equals that of the risky asset if εt > 1 and zero otherwise. The initial state features a high risk-free rate and
a low return on capital.
7.4 Pricing a Government Option to Make Payments to the Living
Table 10 values a government option to make wage-tied payments to the agent, but only if
wages are above their mean. Otherwise, the payment is set to zero. These results illustrate
the capacity of the model to price all types of securities. The table considers the initial
conditions from Table 4, i.e., a high 8.7 percent risk-free rate and a low 4.1 percent return
on capital. This table’s 1-period-from-payoff discount rates (i.e., first column) are almost
three times as large as the rates presented in Table 6. These discount rates decline by over
one half as the number of periods to payoff rises from 1 to 9.
Clearly, the risk premiums decline the farther out the option. For the 1-period old agent,
the risk premium, measured on an annual basis, is roughly 22.5 percent less 8.7 percent,
the prevailing risk-free rate, or 13.8 percent. For a 9-period out payoff, the risk premium is
is 10.3 percent less 8.7 percent or just 1.6 percent. On the other hand, this risk premium
compounds, reducing in roughly half the price a current one-period-old agent would pay for
the option as compared to the sure payoff.30
29We will discuss other panels of this table in section 8.
30The amount 11.08254 is the price of a safe payment paying off in 9 periods as perceived by an age-1 period
agent (see column 9 in Table 4). The amount 11.10354 (see column 9 in Table 10)is the corresponding price of
the risky option. The number 54 is based on our assumption that each period stands for 6 years and we are
considering 9 times 6 periods into the future.
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7.5 Pricing Safe and Risky Payments to the Unborn
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
-1 0.089 0.087 0.085 0.084 0.083 0.083 0.082 0.081 0.081
-2 0.088 0.086 0.085 0.084 0.083 0.082 0.081 0.081 0.081
-3 0.087 0.085 0.084 0.083 0.082 0.082 0.081 0.081 0.080
-4 0.086 0.085 0.083 0.083 0.082 0.081 0.081 0.080 0.080
-5 0.085 0.084 0.083 0.082 0.081 0.081 0.080 0.080 0.080
-18 0.080 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.078
-19 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.078
-20 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.078
Annual Discount Factors for a Safe Asset for the Unborn
Model with Social Security
High Risk-Free Rate, Low Return on Capital Initial State











Risky Method of Compensation
Risk-Free Rate Return on Capital
Current 0.087 0.041
Average 0.069 0.077
Table 11: Annual discount factors for pricing a safe payment promised to the unborn. The initial state
features a high risk-free rate and a low return on capital.
Tables 11 and 12 price government payments to future generations. Table 11 and consid-
ers safe payments and Table 12 considers risky payments. As indicated in equations 26 and
27, these tables consider the government compensating the unborn by holding aside a given
amount of resources, denoted by m−g,t, which is invested at the prevailing rates of return to
capital through the period of birth of the future generation in question. Since the results
are qualitatively very similar regardless of initial conditions, we present results just for the
initial conditions of Table 4.
Unlike in the prior tables, the discount rates of future generations vary more distinctly
by the age of the agent. For example, agents who are age -1 period discount a safe payment
1 period from now at an 8.9 percent rate, whereas agents age -20 discount at a 7.9 percent
rate.31 We also find that making the government payment risky (proportional to the wage)
makes virtually no difference to future generation’s pricing of these promises.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
-1 0.089 0.088 0.086 0.086 0.085 0.084 0.083 0.082 0.082
-2 0.089 0.087 0.086 0.085 0.084 0.083 0.082 0.082 0.081
-3 0.087 0.086 0.085 0.084 0.083 0.082 0.082 0.081 0.081
-4 0.087 0.085 0.084 0.083 0.083 0.082 0.081 0.081 0.081
-5 0.086 0.084 0.084 0.083 0.082 0.082 0.081 0.081 0.080
-18 0.080 0.080 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.078 0.078
-19 0.080 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.078 0.078
-20 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.078 0.078 0.078
Annual Discount Factors for a Risky Asset for the Unborn
Model with Social Security
High Risk-Free Rate, Low Return on Capital Initial State
Risky Method of Compensation
Average 0.069 0.077











Risk-Free Rate Return on Capital
Current 0.087 0.041
Table 12: Annual discount factors for pricing a risky payment promised to the unborn. The initial state
features a high risk-free rate and a low return on capital.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
-1 0.086 0.085 0.084 0.083 0.083 0.082 0.081 0.081 0.080
-2 0.085 0.084 0.083 0.082 0.082 0.081 0.081 0.080 0.080
-3 0.084 0.083 0.082 0.081 0.081 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.079
-4 0.083 0.082 0.081 0.081 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.079 0.079
-5 0.083 0.081 0.081 0.080 0.080 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.079
-18 0.077 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076
-19 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076
-20 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076
Annual Discount Factors for a Safe Asset for the Unborn
Model with Social Security
High Risk-Free Rate, Low Return on Capital Initial State
Safe Method of Compensation
Average 0.069 0.077











Risk-Free Rate Return on Capital
Current 0.087 0.041
Table 13: Annual discount factors for pricing a safe payment promised to the unborn. These safe govern-
ment payment promises to be made at different future dates are reinvested at the risk-free rate. The initial
state features a high risk-free rate and a low return on capital.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
-1 0.087 0.086 0.085 0.084 0.084 0.083 0.082 0.082 0.081
-2 0.086 0.085 0.084 0.083 0.082 0.082 0.081 0.081 0.081
-3 0.085 0.084 0.083 0.082 0.082 0.081 0.081 0.080 0.080
-4 0.084 0.083 0.082 0.082 0.081 0.081 0.080 0.080 0.080
-5 0.083 0.082 0.082 0.081 0.081 0.080 0.080 0.079 0.079
-18 0.077 0.077 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076
-19 0.077 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076
-20 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076
Annual Discount Factors for a Risky Asset for the Unborn
Model with Social Security
High Risk-Free Rate, Low Return on Capital Initial State
Safe Method of Compensation
Average 0.069 0.077











Risk-Free Rate Return on Capital
Current 0.087 0.041
Table 14: Annual discount factors for pricing a risky payment promised to the unborn. These risky
government payment promises to be made at different future dates are reinvested at the risk-free rate. The
initial state features a high risk-free rate and a low return on capital.
7.5.1 Impact of Method of Compensation on Pricing Payments to the Unborn
Like Tables 11 and 12, Tables 13 and 14 present the rates at which unborn (future) gen-
erations would discount safe government payment promises to be made at different future
dates. However, while the former pair of tables consider a risky method of compensation
under which the amount m is reinvested at the risky return to capital, the later pair of tables
consider a “safe” method of compensation under which the amount m is reinvested at the
sequence of safe rates of return. In all four tables the initial condition is characterized by a
high risk-free rate and a low return on capital first introduced in Table 4.
Comparing Tables 11 and 13, which price safe promises, we can see that the discount
rates are uniformly lower when the method of compensation is safe. For example, agents
who are age -1 period discount a safe promise to be received when they are born at an 8.9
percent rate when the method of compensation is risky, whereas they discount at an 8.6
percent rate when the method of compensation is safe. Similarly, agents who are -20 periods
old discount at a 7.9 percent rate when the method of compensation is risky, and at a 7.6
31Under the alternative initial conditions, one-year out discount rates are again close to the prevailing
discount rates for younger future agents. But they can be higher or lower for older future generations
depending on the initial state.
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percent rate when it is safe. Comparing Tables 12 and 14 shows that the same conclusions
hold when pricing risky promises.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
-1 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.047 0.047 0.048 0.048 0.049 0.049
-2 0.048 0.047 0.047 0.048 0.048 0.049 0.049 0.050 0.050
-3 0.049 0.048 0.048 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.050 0.050 0.050
-4 0.050 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.051
-5 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.051 0.051
-18 0.054 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.053
-19 0.054 0.054 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.053
-20 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.053
Risk-Free Rate Return on Capital
Current 0.040 0.057
Average 0.046 0.056
Annual Discount Factors for a Safe Asset for the Unborn
Model without Social Security and Typical Initial State
Risky Method of Compensation











Table 15: Annual discount factors for pricing a safe payment promised to the unborn. These safe govern-
ment payment promises to be made at different future dates are reinvested at the return to capital (“risky
method of compensation”). The initial state corresponds to a typical state of the economy (the middle of
the ergodic distribution).
Tables 15 and 16 present a case where the discrepancy between discount rates for different
methods of compensation is particularly pronounced. These tables price a safe promise to
the unborn in a model without Social Security and starting from a typical initial state. Now,
the discount rate declines from 4.6 percent with risky method of compensation to 4.2 percent
with safe method of compensations for a -1 period old agent, and from 5.4 percent with risky
method of compensation to 4.8 percent with safe method of compensation for a -20 periods
old agent. Interestingly, 5.4 percent is close to the average return on capital of 5.6 percent,
and 4.8 percent is close to the average risk-free rate of 4.6 percent. This result makes sense.
Since starting from a typical state there is no transition period during which the economy
will revert to some average state of nature, the rates of return that will prevail in each of the
ensuing 20 periods (until the -20 period old agent is born) will average out to their long-run
average values. Hence, it is those long-run average values that will matter most for pricing.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
-1 0.042 0.043 0.044 0.045 0.046 0.046 0.047 0.048 0.048
-2 0.043 0.043 0.044 0.045 0.046 0.047 0.047 0.048 0.048
-3 0.043 0.044 0.045 0.046 0.046 0.047 0.048 0.048 0.048
-4 0.045 0.045 0.046 0.046 0.047 0.047 0.048 0.048 0.049
-5 0.045 0.046 0.046 0.047 0.047 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.049
-18 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.049
-19 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.049
-20 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.049 0.049
Average 0.046 0.056
Annual Discount Factors for a Safe Asset for the Unborn
Model without Social Security and Typical Initial State
Safe Method of Compensation











Risk-Free Rate Return on Capital
Current 0.040 0.057
Table 16: Annual discount factors for pricing a safe payment promised to the unborn. These safe gov-
ernment payment promises to be made at different future dates are reinvested at the risk-free rate (“safe
method of compensation”). The initial state corresponds to a typical state of the economy (the middle of
the ergodic distribution).
7.6 Impact of the Bond Market on Pricing
In Tables 17–18 we consider the importance of the bond market to asset pricing. In both
tables, the initial state of the economy is characterize by the low risk-free rate and the high
return on capital first considered in Table 3. In simulating the model without a bond market,
we simply omit the choice of αg,t as well as the constraint that bond holdings sum to zero. The
macro economy with no bond market is essentially identical to that with the bond market.
The bond market certainly helps different generations share contemporaneous shocks, but
it doesn’t materially impact the economy’s aggregate variables.32 This is evident, in part,
from the same 7.7 percent average return on capital reported in both the pricing tables that
include and the ones that exclude the bond market. To be clear, the two models produce
different consumption functions, but in the case of the return to capital, the differences in
the average return is in the fourth decimal place.
The basic message from comparing results with the same initial conditions (identical
state vectors) with and without the bond market is that both safe and risky government
payments may be priced either lower or higher without the bond market depending on the
asset in question, the age of the agent, and the timing of the payoff. But our prior finding
32This is the same finding reported in Hasanhodzic and Kotlikoff (2013, 2017) and Hasanhodzic (2015).
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 0.058 0.059 0.061 0.062 0.063 0.064 0.063 0.064 0.063
2 0.053 0.055 0.057 0.059 0.060 0.060 0.061 0.061
3 0.053 0.055 0.057 0.058 0.058 0.059 0.059
4 0.049 0.051 0.054 0.054 0.055 0.056
5 0.047 0.050 0.051 0.051 0.053
6 0.046 0.046 0.049 0.050





Annual Discount Factors for a Safe Asset for the Living
Model with Social Security and No Bond Market
Same Initial State as in the Case of Low Risk-Free Rate, High Return on Capital










Risk-Free Rate Return on Capital
Table 17: Annual discount factors for pricing a safe payment to the living assuming no bond market. Initial
state features the same low risk-free rate and high return to capital as in the corresponding table with the
bond market.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 0.058 0.060 0.062 0.063 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.065 0.064
2 0.053 0.056 0.059 0.060 0.061 0.061 0.062 0.062
3 0.053 0.056 0.058 0.059 0.060 0.060 0.061
4 0.049 0.053 0.055 0.055 0.057 0.058
5 0.048 0.051 0.052 0.054 0.055
6 0.047 0.048 0.051 0.053





Annual Discount Factors for a Risky Asset for the Living
Model with Social Security and No Bond Market
Same Initial State as in the Case of Low Risk-Free Rate, High Return on Capital










Risk-Free Rate Return on Capital
Table 18: Annual discount factors for pricing a risky payment to the living with no bond market. Initial
state features the same high risk-free rate and low return to capital as in the corresponding table with the
bond market.
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that safe and risky promises are discounted at essentially the same rates continues to hold.
So too does the key point that the pricing of government promises, whether safe or risky,
depends critically on the economy’s current position.
The impact of the bond market can be seen by comparing the first columns in Tables
3 and 17, both of which price a safe government payment one period out. In the former
table, each of the discount rates for a safe payment one year out is very close to 5.0 percent,
the prevailing risk free rate. In the later table, the rates range from 5.8 to 4.0 percent—a
sizable difference. The rates are, with one exception, higher for younger agents and lower
for older agents. This pattern of higher discount rates for the young and lower rates for the
old extends to longer-dated safe government payments.
These results are intuitive. With the short-term bond market, older generations limit
their risk by buying bonds from younger generations. This means that absent the ability to
buy and sell bonds, the young value a safe asset less than the elderly, i.e., they discount a
safe payment at a higher rate.33
Next consider Table 18, which prices risky government payments provided to the living
in the absence of a bond market. The discount rates are strikingly similar to those in Table
17. Hence, once again we find no risk premium for a risky compared to a safe payment.
This is true even for end-of-period 1 payments. The other key point about our results with
no bond market is that the discount rates, as in the case with a bond market, are largely
anchored by what the short-term bond rate would be in the presence of a bond market.
8 Using Our Structural Model To Evaluate Arbitrage
Pricing
Data generated by our model can be used to determine how well specific APT reduced-
forms can approximate the correct pricing of government obligations. Recall that Table 9,
first introduced in Section 7.3, presents regressions of the growth rate of wages on contem-
poraneous safe and risky returns, on returns lagged by one period, and on contemporaneous
plus multiple lagged returns.
Note that using either multiple lags plus contemporaneous returns or one-period lags pro-
duces high R2s – above 0.75. In contrast, the R2 in the regression with just contemporaneous
returns is only 0.072. On the other hand, each regression has highly significant variables.
33Younger generations face relatively more risk from TFP shocks than older ones whose principal is in-
sulated from the shocks. But this principal is directly impacted by depreciation shocks. Such shocks also
impact workers via lower wages, but on balance the risks facing the elderly from both shocks appear to
outweigh those facing the young, who, of course, have more periods over which to recoup losses.
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The first regression with 4 lags plus contemporaneous returns provides only limited support
for the Lucas and Zeldes (2006) and Geanakoplos and Zeldes (2010,2011) view that returns
and wages are strongly correlated over the long term, but not over the short term. Of course,
these authors are making observations about actual data, not data simulated from a highly
stylized model. They are also focused on correlations in annual data, not correlations in
what amounts to roughly six-year data.34
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
High Rb, Low R; Prevailing Rb 0.084 0.084 0.084 0.084 0.084 0.084 0.084 0.084 0.084
High Rb, Low R; Average Rb 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.072
Low Rb, High R; Prevailing Rb 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.057 0.057
Low Rb, High R; Average Rb 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.072
High Rb, Low R; Prevailing Rb 0.087 0.085 0.085 0.084 0.079 0.075 0.073 0.072 0.071
High Rb, Low R; Average Rb 0.070 0.071 0.071 0.071 0.067 0.064 0.062 0.061 0.060
Low Rb, High R; Prevailing Rb 0.054 0.056 0.056 0.057 0.053 0.051 0.050 0.049 0.048
Low Rb, High R; Average Rb 0.074 0.073 0.072 0.072 0.067 0.065 0.063 0.061 0.060
Contemporaneous Returns
Lagged Returns
Periods Till Payoff Received
Annual Discount Rates Based on APT 
Table 19: Annual discount-rate results from using the APT pricing formulas of Blocker, Kotlikoff, and
Ross (2006) to value wage-based payment promises for the same initial high risk-free, low risky rate and low
risk-free, high risky rate cases considered previously in the paper. The APT pricing is based on wage-growth
rate regressions using either contemporaneous returns or one-period lagged returns. Valuation results from
using both the prevailing risk-free rate and the average risk-free rate are presented.
Blocker, Ross and Kotlikoff (2006) present formulas for APT pricing based on wage-
growth rate regressions using either a) contemporaneous returns or b) one-period lagged
returns. In the case of contemporaneous returns, they posit the following relationship be-
tween annual wage growth rates and current returns on market securities.
wt+1
wt
= 1 + α +
∑
i
βifi,t + εt, (31)
where wt is the economy’s average wage at time t, α is a constant, fi,t is the return to asset
i at time t, and the βi’s are regression coefficients.
To value an obligation that’s proportional to the future level of wt+1, they determine the
amount, Ai,t, one would need to invest in risky asset i and the amount Bt one would need to
34The basis for the correlation between current returns and wage growth in our model is simply a standard
production function in which both labor and capital can be immediately adjusted. Modifying this frame-
work to incorporate capital adjustment costs would move our model closer to the Lucas-Tree model that
Geanakoplos and Zeldes (2011) posit to support their empirical findings.
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invest in a safe asset yielding an assumed fixed safe return, r̄, to replicate wt+1, apart from





. The value, VT , of a
wage growth security that pays out wT in expected value is given by
Vt,T = w0




In the case that wage growth is related to one-period lagged returns, the analogous
formula is
Vt,T = w0
(1 + α +∑i βif ′i,t−1
1 + r̄




These two formulas differ in important ways from our consumption-asset pricing. Equa-
tion 32 assumes that the safe rate of return, r̄, is constant through time. It also provides
the same pricing no mater the age of the recipient of the government’s promise to make
a payment that’s proportional to the wage.35 Finally, although we implement the formula
using either the prevailing or average safe rate of return, the formula itself doesn’t depend
on time since, again, r̄ is assumed time-invariant. Equation 33 does depend on time insofar
as it includes lagged returns. But as with equation 32, it assumes a time-invariant interest
rate.
Blocker et al. (2006) also point out that APT pricing becomes highly complex if one
prices wage growth based on asset returns extending over many lags. As mentioned, Lucas
and Zeldes (2006) and Geanakoplos and Zeldes (2010, 2011) surmount this APT pricing
complexity by assuming a tightly structured reduced form relating wage growth to past
security returns.36
Table 19 presents eight sets of annualized discount-rate results from using these APT pric-
ing formulas to value the same wage-based risky government payment promises considered
in Tables 5 and 6. Table 19’s discount rates are directly comparable to their counterparts
in those tables. The first four rows in the table are based on the contemporaneous-returns
regression. Rows 1 and 2 consider the initial high risk-free, low risky returns case. Rows 3
35The value of such a promise is simply proportional to VT .
36Benzoni et al. (2007) test for cointegration between labor and capital income by running an augmented
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test to check whether the variable representing the difference between log-aggregate
labor income and log-dividend is stationary. In our model, the dividend in any period is given by rtKt, and




and 4 consider the initial low risk-free, high risky rate case. Rows 1 and 3 use the prevail-
ing risk-free rate in the valuation formula. Rows 2 and 4 follow Social Security actuaries’
practice of using the average risk-free rate. Row 5 through 8 are the counterparts of rows 1
through 4 except that they use the one-period lagged return formula.
The first thing to point out is that Table 19’s discount rates based on contemporaneous
returns are close, but not identical to those based on returns lagged one period. This
suggests the importance of correctly specifying the reduced form of the arbitrage pricing
relationship. The second point is that the APT pricing is fairly similar to that reported
in Tables 5 and 6 provided one implement the formulas using prevailing, not average safe
rates of return. The upshot here is that which APT formulation one uses matters, but the
particular implementation of the formula matters even more. If one uses, as do the Social
Security actuaries, average rather than prevailing safe rates of return in forming estimates
of government liabilities, one will produce very different pricing. This is particularly clear
by comparing rows 3 and 4 and rows 7 and 8 in Table 19.
9 Conclusion
The proper way to value government commitments when markets are incomplete is a long-
standing, fundamental, yet unresolved question in economics. The reduced-form approach,
which relies on arbitrage pricing, requires strong assumptions about the availability of span-
ning securities (or implicit factors) and the manner of spanning. The alternative approach,
taken here, is to posit, calibrate, and solve a structural model and use consumption-asset
pricing (compensating variation) to price government obligations.
In the past, the curse of dimensionality limited economists’ ability to solve what is ar-
guably one of the most realistic such structural frameworks—a large-scale OLG model with
macro shocks. But computational breakthroughs have made solving OLG in RBC models
eminently feasible. This paper provides an example. It solves a 10-period OLG model with
large, indeed overly large productivity and depreciation shocks.
We use our model to price safe and risky, short- and long-term government payment
promises made to both current and future generations. We find that prevailing, rather than
average (across-time) short-term safe real bond rates play a crucial role in determining the
pricing of short-, medium-, and even long-term safe government net payment promises. They
also are of prime importance to the pricing of risky government net payments. Indeed, we
find remarkably small risk premiums when the government’s net payment being valued is
proportional to the economy’s wage rate. The model does, however, generate large risk
37
premiums (i.e., much higher discount rates/lower prices) for government options, which
promise payments only in good times. We also show that a short-term bond market has
an important, if small impact on pricing government obligations. Finally, we find that, at
least in our context, APT pricing can approximate consumption-asset pricing reasonably
well provided it is implemented using prevailing safe rates of return.
Our paper’s goal was modest—showing in a very simple framework that one can price
securities in large-scale OLG models, which are buffeted by macro shocks, but whose financial
markets are incomplete. Pricing government obligations is just one of a plethora of securities
that can be priced with the machinery used here.
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